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ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER
PLEASURE CRAFT TORTS
The use of watercraft for recreational purposes has expanded dramati-
cally in modern times.' Where the operation of pleasure craft is upon the
navigable waters of the United States2 within the territorial boundaries of
a state the question has arisen whether tort claims arising from suzh opera-
tion are maritime claims within federal admiralty jurisdiction or merely
state law causes of action. If these claims are maritime in nature the sub-
stantive federal maritime law, rather than state tort law, will govern the
issues regardless of the forum. 3 The law in this area is unsettled. The
Supreme Court has enunciated only minimal guidelines for coping with
the issues involved and these have proven insufficient and perhaps unsatis-
factory. The lower federal courts have been unable even to agree on the
relevant policy considerations which ultimately will underlie the rules of law
necessary to settle the issues. Thus the policy considerations adopted by the
federal courts to determine the maritime nature of tort claims is at this
point crucial to the resolution of choice-of-law issues in pleasure craft
litigation.4 Following the Supreme Court's most recent attempt to provide
guidance on the extent of federal admiralty jurisdiction vis-A-vis state law
jurisdiction in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,5 a pro-
nounced difference of opinion has developed among the lower federal courts
1. For example, in 1960 there were 294,000 recreational motor boats (both in-
board and outboard) sold in the United States as compared with 495,000 sold in
1974. In 1960 there were then 5,800,000 recreational boat motors in use, whereas in
1974 the number had increased to 7,595,000. See 1975 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 215. The above statistics do not, of course, take into account the
increase in the number of sailing craft.
2. "Navigable waters" include the high seas, ports and harbors connected with
the high seas, the Great Lakes, and all the rivers and lakes in the United States which
are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of their status as
salt or fresh waters, or their natural or artificial nature, or whether they come within
state boundaries. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 31-33 (2d
ed. 1975) [hereinaftei cited as GILMORE & BLACK1.
3. In personam actions against a vessel owner, in tort or contract, may be
Drought in either federal or state court, pursuant to the "saving to suitors" clause
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (which has since been codified, in a slightly varied form,
as 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)), but any such maritime claim must be decided under the
applicable doctrines of maritime law rather than under state law. See GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 2, at §§ 1-13.
4. It must be stressed at the outset that the federal maritime law applicable to
claims coming within admiralty jurisdiction is a substantive body of doctrines derived
from both federal statutes and the common law. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2,
at 1-2. Thus any decision to extend admiralty jurisdiction to a class of claims formerly
recognized as within state jurisdiction entails not only an alteration of forum, but also
requires that an entirely different body of substantive law be applied to those claims.
5. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
(212)
PLEASURE CRAFT TORTS
as to the maritime nature of tort claims arising from pleasure craft operation.
This comment is intended to put this conflict into perspective by presenting
the opposing positions and attempting to clarify the issues. Some resolution
of those issues should then become possible.
For well over a century federal courts in the United States generally
have assumed that tort claims are maritime in nature when the tort occurs
upon navigable water, so that the locality of the tort has been the primary
determinant of the applicability of federal admiralty jurisdiction and general
maritime law.6 Relying primarily on the authority of the Supreme Court's
decision in The Plymouth7 which found no tort to be maritime unless its
"substance and consummation" were on water,8 the lower courts have con-
sistently held 9 that, if a tort occurs' on navigable waters, claims for injuries
6. The locality over which admiralty jurisdiction was properly extended was
initially limited to tidal waters. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441
(1847); The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). The locality
eventually came to include all waters navigable in interstate and foreign commerce,
even if non-tidal in nature. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 inIra. Those courts
which found the locality test insufficient in determining the maritime nature of tort
claims prior to 1972 were not primarily concerned with pleasure craft tort claims.
In more recent times there has been considerable expansion of admiralty tort
jurisdiction inland by means of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 740 (1970), which provides that
[t]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and
include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel
on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or
consummated on land.
It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that it was intended as a limited
exception to the locality rule, to be applied primarily in those cases where a vessel on
navigable water causes damage to a land structure. See 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
Smy. 1898-1904.
Admiralty jurisdiction over contract claims in the United States was never
thought to be limited by locality. Admiralty jurisdiction "extends over all contracts
(wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of
the stipulations) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."
De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444, No. 3776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
7. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866) (admiralty jurisdiction was not extended to
claims arising from a fire which spread from a vessel on navigable waters to a ware-
house on shore as the damage to the warehouse was completed on land).
8. Id. at 34-36.
9. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, Inc., 406
F.2d 917, 919 (1st Cir. 1969); Penn Tanker Co. v. U.S., 409 F.2d 514, 518 (5th Cir.
1969) ; Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14, 31 (3d Cir. 1967) ; The Strabo,
90 F. 110, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1898); Herman v. Port Blakley Mill Co., 69 F. 646, 647
(N.D. Cal. 1895) ; The H.S. Pickands, 42 F. 239, 240 (E.D. Mich. 1890).
10. Determining where a tort "occurs" for purposes of the locality test has
produced some problems. Compare, Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935) (longshoreman's cause of action held within admiralty jurisdiction where he
was knocked into navigable water from vessel's deck after he was struck by a hoist),
with T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (longshoreman's cause of
action held not to be within admiralty jurisdiction where longshoreman was knocked
into navigable water from the pier by a cargo sling). See also Executive Jet Aviation,
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to person or property arising from the tort may be heard in federal court
under the general maritime law. So long as the large majority of tort actions
brought in federal court under the maritime law involved claims from
the shipping industry, no major problems were encountered with locality
as the sole jurisdictional test.
Modern developments in the area of pleasure craft operation have
served to initiate a process of examination by the lower federal courts of
the sufficiency of locality as a theoretical basis for the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction over tort claims. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
expressed substantial doubt whether the legitimate functions and purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction and the separate body of federal maritime law"
are compatible with local interests in pleasure craft operation. According
to the Fourth Circuit, the application of maritime law to pleasure craft
torts may tend to abrogate these interests. The Eighth and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have taken a contrary view, expressing satisfaction that
the application of maritime law to pleasure crafts is fully appropriate in
light of what these courts consider to be the traditional concerns of mari-
time law.12 The remaining circuits have either taken a middle ground
position or have not directly confronted the issue as a policy matter.'
8
Background
Article III, section two of the Constitution of the United States extends
the "judicial power of the United States" to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." The debates with respect to this particular portion
of section two, both in the Constitutional Convention and elsewhere, shed
very little light on what the Framers intended by the word "jurisdiction.' 4
Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971) (because plane lost power
over land due to defendant's allegedly negligent omission, the tort occurred on land
even though the plane crashed in navigable waters). Under the locality test, the
primary criterion as to where a tort "occurred" has been that "[t]he substance and
consummation of the occurrance which gave rise to the cause of action took place on
land." T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182 (1928). Cf. Note, 47 TuL.
L. REv. 1143 (1974).
11. The view of the legitimate functions and purposes of the admiralty jurisdic-
tion is that its basic raison d'etre is to provide a special industry court for commercial
maritime interests. See text accompanying note 53 infra. Gilmore and Black have also
endorsed this view. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 30.
12. The basic difference between the view of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and
that of the Fourth Circuit appears to be a belief by the former circuits that admiralty
jurisdiction rightfully extends to a broader range of interests than just those of mari-
time commerce. See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
13. The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits fall primarily
in the middle ground area, as does the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Their respective positions are discussed in note 102 infra.
14. That the importance of a more definite admiralty clause in Article III was
not recognized by the convention is clear from the lack of recorded debate on the
subject. See Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction,
10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 469-70 (1925). It also appears from the debates preceding the
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Congress recognized that this clause was not self-executing, for it granted
the federal district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,"' 5 with certain exceptions where
concurrent jurisdiction was recognized in both state and federal courts.16
While not clearly indicating what was meant by "jurisdiction," the statute
has been consistently construed as granting access to federal courts for all
claims under the general maritime law without reference to amount in
controversy, diversity of citizenship, or the presence of any "federal ques-
tion."'17 A question remained, however, as to the basis upon which claims
under the general maritime law were to be distinguished from other sorts
of claims so as to justify invocation of admiralty jurisdiction.
The first rough attempt at resolving this issue came in De Lovio v.
Bolt.'8 Justice Story there rejected as inappropriate the absolute rule of
locality which had restricted the British Court of Admiralty. Under that
rule, admiralty tort and contract jurisdiction was limited to claims arising
from events occurring on tidal waters. Since the British court was subject
to statutes not applicable to the colonies, a different rule seemed appropriate
for the newly constituted American courts. Story drew upon the experience
of the sea courts of other countries, as well as those of the colonies, in con-
cluding that the federal admiralty jurisdiction
comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter
branch is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends over all
contracts (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever
may be the form of the stipulations) which relate to the navigation,
business, or commerce of the sea. 19
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that, while there was great controversy as to
how broad federal jurisdiction should be, no one ever questioned what admiralty
jurisdiction was or whether it should be included in the whole range of federal juris-
diction. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 67, 123 (1923); see also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL VIEW 10 (1973).
15. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77.
16. Under the original wording of the "saving clause," the Supreme Court found
that concurrent jurisdiction existed only where the relief sought was a common law
remedy already available in state courts. This was taken to mean that in rem actions
based on the "maritime lien" concept could only be brought in federal court, because
these actions did not involve common law remedies. See The Hine v. Trevor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
Subsequent rewording of the saving clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1949) has left this
limitation with respect to concurrent state court jurisdiction somewhat in doubt. See
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 39.
17. See, e.g., Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877); Glass v. The Sloop Betsy,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794); National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F.
Supp. 499, 503 (D. Mass. 1942).
18. 7 F. Cas. 418, No. 3776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). Justice Story was sitting as a
circuit judge.
19. Id. at 444.
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The result of De Lovio was that admiralty jurisdiction over torts remained
governed by the actual locality of the tort, while the jurisdictional question
with respect to claims based on maritime contracts no longer depended on
the locality in which they were made or consummated.2 0 Determining ad-
miralty jurisdiction over torts, then, became a question of drawing geo-
graphical lines.
The placement of these lines derived primarily from history. Under
the British rule the jurisdiction of the British Court of Admiralty was
limited to the high seas and tidal waters. 21 As England is an island with
few navigable non-tidal waters, this restriction posed only minor problems.
The United States, on the other hand, possesses a significant number of
navigable, non-tidal bodies of water upon which there exists a large volume
of maritime traffic. For some time the Supreme Court limited admiralty
jurisdiction to tidal waters, adhering to the English rule.22 In 1845, how-
ever, Congress passed a statute extending admiralty jurisdiction to the
Great Lakes.2 3 In the Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh2 4 the Supreme Court not
only held this statute constitutional but also found as a general matter that
admiralty jurisdiction subsisted on Lake Ontario and on other navigable
bodies of water in the country by virtue of their being navigable in inter-
state commerce.
25
The ultimate consequence of these various lines of cases was that, prior
to Executive Jet, the jurisdiction of the federal courts for tort claims alleg-
ing a violation of the general maritime law depended upon the "substance"
of the tort taking place on navigable water. This was the so-called "strict
locality" test,20 which the Supreme Court in Executive Jet purported to
change.
The Executive Jet Analysis
Executive Jet was the first case in which the Supreme Court directly
confronted the locality test of admiralty tort jurisdiction. The Court found
the test wanting.2 7 The case involved the crash of a private jet airliner
20. This was surely the result contemplated by Justice Story. See Thomas v.
Hane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960, No. 13902 (C.C.D. Me. 1813), wherein his views as to
admiralty tort jurisdiction are made explicit
21. See Mears, The History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 312, 328-34 (1908).
22. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The Thomas
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) .
23. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726-27.
24. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
25. Id. at 454-55.
26. See notes 7, 8 & 10 supra.
27. It is possible to read the Court's modification of admiralty tort jurisdiction
in Executive Jet as limited to aviation cases. See 409 U.S. at 265-68; see also text
accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
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into the navigable waters of Lake Erie. 28 The plane was taking off on a
flight within the continental United States which would be primarily over
land, and the Court considered this fact highly significant in holding that
federal admiralty jurisdiction is not properly exercised over aviation torts
absent legislation to the contrary.29 The Court reasoned that the activity of
the plaintiff bore no "significant relationship" to "traditional maritime ac-
tivity involving navigation and commerce" sufficient to make the jetliner
owner's claim "maritime. '30 This is the Executive Jet "maritime nexus"
test for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, the full meaning of which is
still in question.
The Court in Executive Jet was not compelled by precedent to apply
the locality test, which would dictate a finding of admiralty jurisdiction over
the owner's claim,31 because none of the Court's prior decisions had ex-
pressly endorsed locality as the exclusive determinant for admiralty juris-
diction.3 2 While the Court cited no case of its own where the locality test
had been repudiated, it did quote from Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek33
to the effect that the exclusivity of the locality test was at least an open
question. 34 Thus the Court was free to avoid an overly "mechanical" appli-
cation of the locality test even though a majority of the lower federal courts
28. The owner of the aircraft brought this action for damages in federal court
against the City of Cleveland, a federal air traffic controller, and the manager of the
airport from which the plane had departed. The owner's theory of liability was that
the negligent failure of the respondents either to keep the runway free of seagulls or
to warn the pilot of their presence resulted in the total loss of the aircraft when it
sank in Lake Erie. The plane went down due to a loss of power resulting from its
ingestion of a flock of seagulls flushed from the runway by the noise and vibration
of the plane's takeoff. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of admiralty
jurisdiction, the only ground of federal jurisdiction asserted by the plaintiff, and the
court of appeals affirmed, finding that there was no maritime locality as the tort had
"occurred" over land. Id. at 250-52.
29. The court limited this holding to those flights by land-based aircraft between
points within the continental United States, as these flights are primarily over land.
Id. at 274.
30. Id. at 272.
31. In a case involving a factual situation substantially the same as that presented
by Executive Jet, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found a wrongful death claim
to be within admiralty jurisdiction by application of the locality test. See Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. "Despite the broad language of cases like The Plymouth, ... the fact is that
this court has never explicitly held that a maritime locality is the sole test of
admiralty tort jurisdiction." 409 U.S. at 258.
33. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
34. The Court found the following passage from Imbrovek persuasive:
Even if it be assumed that the requirement as to locality in tort cases, while in-
dispensible, is not necessarily exclusive, still in the present case the wrong which
was the subject of the suit was, we think, of a maritime nature and hence the
District Court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction. . ..
409 U.S. at 258, quoting from 234 U.S. at 61-62.
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confronted with the sort of jurisdictional issue present in Executive Jet
had interpreted The Plymouth as foreclosing the issue. 5
The Court's primary concern in adopting the maritime nexus test in
Executive Jet was the existence of "perverse and casuistic borderline"36
situations where admiralty jurisdiction could be invoked under the locality
rule, but where the coverage of maritime law would be inappropriate.37 The
Court determined that the locality test, when applied to situations like the
one before it, would result in the coverage of maritime law being extended
or denied on the basis of entirely fortuitous circumstances wholly unrelated
to any distinctively maritime interest. 38 The Court cited instances 39 where
Congress and the lower federal courts had found it necessary to expand
admiralty jurisdiction beyond the confines of the locality test in order to
extend maritime law to obviously maritime tort claims which by chance
happened to be consummated on land. In narrowing that jurisdiction so
as to exclude some tort claims from admiralty even though they may occur
on navigable waters, the Court was following the same principle of applying
maritime law only where appropriate. 40
In its rush to tailor admirality jurisdiction strictly to maritime claims,
however, the Court created some serious problems. Executive Jet is subject
to at least three equally supportable interpretations as to how extensively
the new maritime nexus test reduces the force of the old locality test 1.4  A
narrow reading of Executive Jet, limiting its holding as much as possible
to the factual situation there involved, indicates that locality is still the
primary determinant of admiralty jurisdiction outside the overland aviation
tort context, especially where waterborne vessels are involved. 42  This
35. See note 9 supra.
36. 409 U.S. at 255.
37. See id. at 255-56 n.5 where the Court in dictum voiced apparent disapproval
of admiralty jurisdiction for injuries to water skiers, swimmers, and surfers. Appar-
ently the Court was merely expressing discomfort with lower court cases which had
extended admiralty jurisdiction to situations "where the invocation of admiralty juris-
diction seem[ed] almost absurd," even though maritime locality was present. Id. at 255.
The Court made no attempt to reveal the precise factual basis for its conclusion that
a water skier's activity bears no connection to the traditional forms of maritime com-
merce and navigation, so that it is unclear what particular aspects of that activity the
Court found deprived such a claim of any "maritime nexus." In Crosson v. Vance, 484
F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's remarks,
however, seeing in them an "explicit direction" to exclude such claims from admiralty
jurisdiction. 484 F.2d at 842.
38. The Court's particular concern was with the fortuity of the crash site deter-
mining the dividing line between state and federal jurisdiction. See 409 U.S. at 266.
39. Id. at 259-61.
40. Id. at 261.
41. See Bridwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for Executive
Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757, where the various interpretations are discussed.
42. See, e.g., Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1973);
Watson v. D/S A/S Idaho, 359 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ; Maryland v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973); cf. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973).
218 [VOL. 36
PLEASURE CRAFT TORTS
interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court's narrowly drawn holding
in Executive Jet43 and by the absence of any specific rejection of the locality
requirement. A somewhat more expansive reading would render locality a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition of admiralty jurisdiction. This in-
terpretation would require not only that the tort occur on navigable waters,
but it also would require some "maritime nexus" between the wrong and
traditional maritime concerns.4 4 This reading is ultimately not very per-
suasive. If a "maritime nexus" is always to be required before admiralty
jurisdiction attaches, it is difficult to perceive how locality can remain a
requirement given the Court's recognition in Executive Jet that admiralty
jurisdiction can be extended inland when the needs of justice so require.45
Finally, it can be argued that Executive Jet discards the locality requirement
completely. Since the Court explicitly approved the extension of admiralty
tort jurisdiction inland when the claim involved was essentially maritime in
nature,46 locality would seem to have been supplanted by "maritime nexus"
as the controlling jurisdictional test. Which of these readings is ultimately
adopted will control the extent to which the lower federal courts are free
to consider what they perceive to be the important principles and policies
relevant to extending or denying admiralty jurisdiction to pleasure craft
litigation.
In addition the Court offered little guidance as to the content of "tra-
ditional maritime activities," to which, under the test, the parties' activities
must relate.4 7 It thus becomes apparent that Executive Jet, while attempting
to reach a greater consistency in the application of maritime law in the
lower courts, has actually sown the seeds of confusion in those courts; the
opinion allows a lower court to apply maritime law largely on the basis of
its own assessment of what constitutes a "traditional maritime activity. '48
Confusing the matter further are three pre-Executive Jet decisions 49
in which the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over pleasure craft torts
43. "For the reasons stated in this opinion we hold that . . .there is no federal
admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims arising from flights by land-based
aircraft between points within the continental United States." 409 U.S. at 274.
44. See Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973).
45. See 409 U.S. at 259-61.
46. See Teachy v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
47. While the Court was fairly explicit as to what sorts of aviation activities
do not supply a "maritime nexus," it did not purport to say what activities would
provide such a nexus, in an aviation context or otherwise. See 409 U.S. at 268; cf.
Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 41, at 761-62. The obvious consequence of this
nebulous concept is that the lower courts are free to pour meaning into the "maritime
nexus" mould based upon their own conception of what constitute "traditional maritime
activities." See text accompanying notes 53 infra.
48. See note 47 supra.
49. See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1963) (wrongful death action arising
out of the collision of two motorboats on the Ohio River treated as being in admiralty) ;
Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943) (allowed limitation petition by owner of
pleasure yacht arising from fire on yacht) ; Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941)
(allowed limitation petition arising from carbon monoxide poisoning in cabin cruiser).
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without discussion of the jurisdictional issue. As a matter of precedent,
therefore, the applicability of federal maritime law to pleasure boat litigation
seems established. Reconciling these precedents with the Court's later-
expressed policy of extending admiralty jurisdiction only to appropriately
maritime claims, however, has proven a difficult task for the lower courts.
The Lower Court Conflict
No federal court has been more adamant than the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in insisting, as a matter of policy, that most tort claims arising
out of the operation of pleasure boats should not be allowed within federal
admiralty jurisdiction. Although accepting as a matter of Supreme Court
precedent that jurisdiction does in fact extend to such tort claims, a pair
of remarkable decisions by the Fourth Circuit, Crosson v. Vance50 and
Richards v. Blake Builders Supply Co.,5 1 are highly critical of this position.
The Fourth Circuit's chief objection to maritime coverage is that pleasure
boating is not substantially related to what it sees as the traditional purpose
of the admiralty courts, to provide a uniform body of law for the essentially
international maritime shipping industry.52 In essence, then, the Fourth
Circuit has taken the position that the "maritime nexus" requirement of
Executive Jet should be read as necessitating a connection between the tor-
tious activity giving rise to the claim and some form of maritime commerce. 58
The first opportunity that the Fourth Circuit had to apply Executive
Jet in the pleasure craft area was in Crosson v. Vance. There the court
denied admiralty jurisdiction to a water-skier who had been injured when
the boat that had been pulling him struck a sandbar in the Chesapeake Bay.5 4
In a rather perfunctory opinion, the court found that the exercise of ad-
miralty jurisdiction was inappropriate because there was no "substantial
federal interest" 55 involved in the controversy and little connection with the
"traditional concerns of admiralty." 56 The court found support for its
denial of admiralty jurisdiction on these grounds in what it saw as a dis-
50. 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973).
51. 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975).
52. 528 F.2d at 74748.
53. Thus, the Fourth Circuit stated that
[i]f there be a continuing need for a relatively uniform body of laws for the
governance of the commercial shipping industry, there is not such apparent need
for the regulation of the operation of private pleasure craft aside from the Rules
of the Road, laws and regulations relating to lights and the provision and mainte-
nance of lifesaving and safety equipment and similar matters. The Congress, by
statute, and the Coast Guard, by regulation, can provide all of the uniform rules
needed for the operation of small pleasure craft, but those can be interpreted and
enforced by state courts as well as by federal judges.
Id. at 747.
54. 484 F.2d 840-41.
55. Id. at 841 n.4.
56. Id. at 840.
[VOL. 36
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approval by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet of the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction in this specific sort of situation, i.e., water-skiing.5 7
Given the holding in Crosson that a water-skier has no admiralty claim
due to the insubstantial connection of his activity with maritime commerce,
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Richards v. Blake Builders Supply Co. is
surprising. Richards involved separate cases that were decided together
because the court determined that they presented the same jurisdictional
issue. One case arose from injuries received by a pleasure boat passenger
due to an allision of the boat in which he was riding against the bank of a
navigable river.5 8 Blake Builders Supply, the owner of the boat, in reply to
the passenger's complaint petitioned to limit its liability pursuant to the
Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act.59 The Fourth Circuit upheld
admiralty jurisdiction. ° The other case arose from claims for injuries and
death resulting from a motor boat explosion occurring on a navigable lake
lying between Virginia and North Carolina. 6 ' Again the Fourth Circuit
found admiralty jurisdiction over the negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability in tort claims pressed by the injured parties against the manu-
facturer and vendor of the boat.
6 2
The consequence of Richards and Crosson appears to be that, while a
water-skier being pulled by a motorboat has no cause of action in admiralty
for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of the boat as his ac-
tivity bears no substantial relationship to the "traditional concerns of ad-
miralty, '65 a passenger in a pleasure boat, injured by the same sort of
negligent operation, will have a claim in admiralty.6 4 The explanation for
this anomolous result seems to be both in the policy of the Fourth Circuit
57. The Supreme Court had expressed doubt as to the propriety of allowing a
water-skier's claim into admiralty, but it did not purport to overturn the case where
such a claim had been permitted. Because this doubt was expressed in dicta some
question remains. See note 37 supra. The Fourth Circuit's assured tone in Crosson is
therefore difficult to understand.
58. The accident occurred on an outing in a high-powered motorboat on the
Northeast Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Plaintiff sued the owner of the craft
for damages on the theory that the craft was negligently operated. 528 F.2d at 746.
59. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1970). By this statutory device, a shipowner may
limit the amount of his liability for personal injury or property damage caused by
negligence in the vessel's operation or by structural or other defects in the ship, to
the value of the vessel after the injury-causing event provided he had neither "privity"
nor "knowledge" of the injury-causing negligence or defect. See 46 U.S.C. § 183
(1970). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at §§ 10-1, 10-4, 10-5 - 10-13.
60. 528 F.2d at 749.
61. The explosion occurred on Lake Gaston, an artificial lake on the Roanoke
River, which, although it is not the site of extensive maritime commerce, the court
found to be navigable.
62. The district court had read Crosson as requiring this exclusion of plaintiffs'
claims from admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 746.
63. 484 F.2d at 840-41.
64. This was the precise result in Richards. 528 F.2d 478-79.
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in restricting admiralty jurisdiction to essentially commercial claims and in
the slippery concept of "maritime nexus" introduced by Executive Jet.6 5
A careful reading of Crosson and Richards indicates that the Fourth
Circuit has determined that the "maritime nexus" test should be more
restrictive than was mandated by Executive Jet.66 The court indicated its
belief that admiralty jurisdiction should only be invoked where the federal
interest in a uniform body of law for the international maritime shipping
industry clearly outweighs the state interest in providing a local remedy
which would take local peculiarities into account.6 7 Thus, in exercising
admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim arising from an incident on a state's
navigable waters, the Fourth Circuit would require a showing of some
connection s with either: commercial maritime commerce or at least with
some substantial federal interest which so required uniform treatment as
to be an inappropriate subject for state court jurisdiction.6 9 In Richards
the court indicated that, based on its conception of the appropriate "maritime
nexus" test, pleasure boat claims occurring within a state's navigable waters
would be a more appropriate subject for state, rather than federal, adjudi-
cation.7 ° The court was particularly concerned with the prospect of provid-
ing a federal forum for non-diversity tort claims occurring wholly within
a state's boundaries. The Fourth Circuit noted that in such cases the state
courts were equally capable of handling the claims, 71 and that the applica-
bility of state rather than maritime law 72 to such claims would allow the
65. See notes 47 & 53 supra.
66. After indicating the effect of Executive Jet on Crosson, the Court in Richards
concluded "that admiralty jurisdiction is present, though we think the jurisdiction
should be limited to exclude cases such as these." 528 F.2d 746.
67. See 528 F.2d at 747.
68. In applying the maritime nexus test in Crosson, the Fourth Circuit considered
only the plaintiff's activity. If the defendant's activity - operation of the ski boat -
is considered, then Crosson becomes indistinguishable from Richards and the three
pre-Executive Jet Supreme Court pleasure boat cases. No justification for this one-
sided analysis is apparent in the Fourth Circuit's opinions. In Executive Jet the Court
required "that the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activi-
ties." 409 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).
69. See 528 F.2d at 747-48. See also note 53 supra, where the court indicated
that the principal federal interests in pleasure boating could easily be protected by
state courts.
70. See 528 F.2d at 747-48.
71. The court said that the state courts are
systems which are as capable of dealing with controversies arising out of a collision
of two small motorboats as with controversies arising out of the collision of two
automobiles on an interstate highway.
Id. at 747.
72. Among the advantages to a tort claimant in having his claim decided under
the maritime law are that the maritime law does not recognize contributory negligence
as an absolute defense, as do many states, see Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305
U.S. 424, 431 (1938), and that the higher degree of negligence necessary to trigger
the liability of a boat owner to his passenger under state guest statutes is not required
in admiralty as such statutes would be inapplicable. See St. Hilaire Moye v. Hender-
son, 496 F.2d 973, 979-81 (8th Cir. 1974).
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state court to adjudicate the claims in a manner sensitive to local state
interests to which a federal court applying federal law might well be in-
different73 In addition the court expressed doubt that liability theories
deriving from state legislation and common law could be enforced in an
admiralty action.7 4 The court also registered a fear that applying admiralty
law to allow a pleasure craft owner to limit his liability to the value of the
craft after an injury-causing event would result in severe injustice to an
injured party.7 5
It must be noted that the court's policy formulation in Richards would
not involve an absolute bar to all claims arising from pleasure boat opera-
tion. In particular, the court recognized that many pleasure craft are
operated on the high seas, far outside the territorial waters of any state.7 6
For those sorts of cases the court indicated that the policies militating
against a finding of admiralty jurisdiction would not apply.
Perhaps what is needed is congressional attention to the matter, for the
Congress after hearings, could tailor the jurisdiction to the need, re-
linquishing to the states and to their judicial systems those controversies
better handled there while retaining for federal admiralty jurisdiction
those controversies for which it is better equipped.7 7
It is thus apparent that, under the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, the avail-
ability of federal maritime law would be a matter of locality as well as
of "maritime nexus.27 8
From the policy announced above, it appears that the court in Richards
would have denied admiralty jurisdiction in both cases for want of a suffi-
cient "maritime nexus" to override the state interest in applying its own
tort law to these claims ;79 however, the court sustained admiralty jurisdic-
tion on the sole ground that a sufficient "maritime nexus" must exist when
pleasure craft on navigable waters are a direct cause of a tort claim because
the Supreme Court had so held, without discussion of the jurisdictional
point, in the three pre-Executive Jet cases.80
Given this difference in underlying policy between Executive Jet and
Richards, the Crosson anomaly is not hard to understand. The court in
Crosson sought to eliminate as many of the "perverse and casuistic border-
73. 528 F.2d 747.
74. 528 F.2d at 748.
75. Id. at 748. For discussion of the limitation of a shipowner's liability, see
note 59 supra.
76. See 528 F.2d at 748.
77. Id. at 748.
78. This special recognition of locality - distinguishing between navigable waters
that are state territorial waters and the high seas - would clearly cause admiralty
jurisdiction to depend upon a mere fortuity, contrary to the policy of Executive Jet.
See text accompanying note 38 supra. The Fourth Circuit did not discuss or recognize
this problem.
79. See note 66 supra.
80. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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line" cases as possible, and thus found that a water-skier's activity bore
little connection to either maritime commerce or navigation.81 The court
considered that it could safely deny application of maritime law on the basis
of an "explicit leave" 82 to do so in Executive Jet; however, the court could
find no such "explicit leave" when it came to torts involving the actual
operation of pleasure craft as the Supreme Court had actually decided such
cases under the maritime law.83 The cutting edge between Crosson and
Richards is thus their different factual relationships to a federal navigational
interest allowed for in the broad Executive Jet "maritime nexus" test.
Richards involved a "substantial relationship" to such an interest, and thus
allowed the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction, while Crosson bore no
such relationship. This constitutes a high degree of hair-splitting and the
court recognized the conceptual problem it had created.84 Nevertheless,
this muddled state of affairs continues in the Fourth Circuit.85
While the Fourth Circuit has come away from the broadly worded
"maritime nexus" test of Executive Jet with a restrictive policy and an in-
consistent set of cases purporting to apply that test, the Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a far broader policy con-
sidered consistent with both the letter and the spirit of Executive Jet. While
the Fourth Circuit was primarily concerned in Richards with excluding
from the application Of admiralty law essentially local claims more appro-
priately dealt with by local law so as to preserve federal admiralty law as
the uniform body of regulations of a basically international and interstate
industry, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have been more concerned with
maintaining a consistency of results where admiralty jurisdiction is present,
regardless of the commercial nature of the activities involved.
In St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson,"8 the Eighth Circuit found that
maritime law could justifiably be applied to a claim arising on a navigable
81. See 484 F.2d at 840. In Crosson the court found that water skiing has "little
connection with the traditional concerns of admiralty." The Crosson court indicated
that these concerns were limited by Executive Jet to commercial and navigational
interests. Id. at 841-42.
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id. at 842-43.
84. The court acknowledged this problem when it said:
Conceptually, we have some difficulty distinguishing between the claim by a water
skier against the operator of a towing boat and a claim by a passenger against the
operator of a motorboat. . . . [I]n the one instance, [the Supreme Court] gave
us explicit leave to hold the controversy outside of admiralty jurisdiction while
its own decisions seem to call for an exercise of the jurisdiction and an application
of general maritime law when the claimants are occupants of the boat.
528 F.2d at 749.
85. Cf. Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975), decided fifteen days
after Richards, the court found that a pleasure craft owner who was towing a skier
on state territorial waters had a cause of action in admiralty against the United States
for failing to remove or mark a wreck upon which the owner's boat had been damaged.
Id. at 179.
86. 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974).
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river where the plaintiff was injured when she fell from a negligently op-
erated pleasure craft.8 7 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit the court in
St. Hilaire Moye found that "[t] he use of a waterborne vessel on navigable
waters presents a case falling appropriately within the historical scope and
design of the law of admiralty."'8 Implicit in this holding is a formulation of
policy to the effect that the proper focus of the maritime law is upon water-
borne vessels, rather than upon waterborne commerce alone.8 9 The justi-
fication for this emphasis is found in the federal interest in protecting navi-
gation and commerce on navigable waters.90 Waterborne vessels, whether
commercial or non-commercial, clearly create a potential threat to this
interest.91 The court found that pleasure boats are waterborne "vessels"
within the relevant statutory definition, and as such, their operation is a
"traditional maritime activity to which the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts may extend. '92 Because their activity comes within the
sphere of "traditional maritime activity," the court found the Executive Jet
''maritime nexus" test easily satisfied in the case of pleasure craft operations
on navigable wafer, regardless of the exact nature of the operations. 93
A similar conclusion was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Oppen v.
Aetna Insurance Co.,94 a case where several owners of private pleasure
craft sought recovery for loss of the use of their vessels due to the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill. The court found under maritime law that loss of
the use of a private pleasure craft was not a compensible item of damages, 95
while property damage to the vessels would be compensible, 96 and that both
87. The plaintiff was thrown from the boat when it was shifted into reverse
at a high rate of speed. Plaintiff's leg was severely injured by the boat's propeller.
Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages, and she received an award
of $84,000 after trial. Defendants appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to
dismiss for lack of admiralty jurisdiction and the trial court's refusal to apply the
Arkansas guest statute which would require a showing of "wilful and wanton"
negligence. Id. at 974-75. The court affirmed the trial court's decisions in both
instances. Id. at 982.
88. Id. at 979. See also Luna v. State of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973),
where defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of admiralty jurisdiction over plaintiff's
claim arising from an injury suffered on board a permanently moored sailing vessel
was denied on the ground that the alleged tort occurred on board a vessel in navigable
waters. The court found a sufficient maritime nexus to invoke application of the sub-
stantive maritime law.
89. 496 F.2d at 979.
90. Id.
91. Having concluded that admiralty jurisdiction should be broadly defined in
reference to "vessels," the court noted that it could not be asserted that "the term
,vessel' in admiralty law is limited to ships or vessels engaged in commerce." Id.
at 979. The court cited as controlling the definition of "vessel" established by 1 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1970) : "The word 'vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other arti-
ficial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water."
92. 496 F.2d at 979.
93. Id.
94. 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 257.
96. Id. at 260.
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sorts of claims were properly cognizable in admiralty. 97 The court stated
that
Executive Jet does not compel a reversal in the present case.... Such
claims do bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime ac-
tivity. It is precisely plaintiffs' alleged rights to engage in "traditional
maritime activity" that they are seeking to protect.98
Just as in St. Hilaire Moye, the court in Oppen gave an expansive reading
to Executive Jet, finding the "maritime nexus" necessary to sustain ad-
miralty jurisdiction and application of maritime law whenever the claim in
issue should arise from either the actual or potential use of a waterborne
vessel on navigable waters.99 For these courts, then, the federal interest
in maintaining navigability is a sufficient "maritime nexus" to sustain fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction on admiralty grounds, regardless of local
law interests or the non-commercial nature of the plaintiff's activity. 100
Analysis and Criticism
In Richards the Fourth Circuit first determined that there was no
reason to be found in the traditional purposes and functions of a separate
body of maritime law for applying that law to pleasure craft cases. 1 1 Rely-
ing primarily upon the historical analysis of one scholar,102 the court stated
that for federal jurisdictional purposes, tort claims arising from pleasure
97. Id. at 257.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 496 F.2d at 979; 485 F.2d at 257. Other federal courts have acted recently
in this area without considering the special status, if one exists, of pleasure craft. See
Kelley v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court found a civil action
for damages due to the gunshot wounding of a passenger of a small motor boat on the
Mississippi River to be within admiralty jurisdiction, even though the rifle fire causing
the accident came from shore, on the rationale that the rifle fire endangered navigation.
The court saw a substantial federal interest in navigation, but it did not confront the
pleasure craft issue directly. Cf. Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643 (1st
Cir. 1973), where the court determined that a raft is not a "vessel" unless it is used
to encounter the "perils of navigation." Thus, a claim arising from a tort occurring
on a raft in navigable waters does not meet the "maritime nexus" requirement of
Executive Jet. See also Hammill v. Olympic Airways, 398 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C.
1975), where a wrongful death action arising from a flight from the Greek Islands to
Athens over international waters was found to lie in admiralty as the plane was
performing a function traditionally exercised by seagoing vessels. Although not con-
sidering pleasure craft, the court was expansive with respect to the sorts of activities
having a maritime nexus.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals purported to reject the locality test even
before Executive Jet was decided. See Chapman v. City of Gross Point Farms, 385
F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). It is not at all clear, however, how that court would treat
the pleasure craft controversy.
101. See 528 F.2d at 747-48.
102. Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV.
661 (1962).
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boat operation in state territorial waters should not, in principle, be treated
any differently than automobile torts ;103 even if these tort claims were
capable of being brought in federal court on diversity grounds, the state tort
law should be applied.' 04 The court reasoned that state courts are clearly
competent to hear these tort claims, as they are handled routinely by state
courts in the automobile context.'0 5 Absent some overriding federal interest
in the type of controversy involved, state courts should be allowed to protect
local interests by applying state law to the controversy. 0 6
The court in Richards saw no overriding federal interest in pleasure
boat torts occurring on state waters. Historically the only reason for having
a separate admiralty jurisdiction was to provide a uniform body of law for
maritime commerce so as to make the important legal affairs of maritime
commerce as predictable as possible. 10 7 Therefore, the court reasoned,
maritime law should not be extended to situations where such a need for
uniformity does not exist.'0 8 The court argued that a need for uniformity
of law does not exist in cases involving only pleasure craft operation in
state territorial waters, as these cases are to be viewed as primarily local
in character, involving craft which have no more interstate contact than do
automobiles. 10 9 It was on the basis of this argument that the court an-
nounced a policy of limiting admiralty tort jurisdiction to commercial mari-
time claims.
This argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, it is
difficult to conceive what is added by the presence of commercial interests
in a tort claim so as to achieve the result intended by the Richards analysis.
Second, it is clear that the federal interest in uniformity must be far broader
than merely commercial maritime traffic, given the policy adopted by the
Supreme Court on the matter of federal interest. 110
The Richards analysis fails to take into account the fact that com-
mercial tort claims arising on state waters may be every bit as local as
pleasure craft tort claims, and may therefore involve just as many local
interests, without any greater need for uniformity on a national level. It is
hard to believe that a commercial fishing vessel which never leaves a state's
territorial waters is in any different position than is a pleasure craft as
103. See passage cited at note 71 supra.
104. Professor Stolz's position, as summarized with approval by the court, is that
state legislatures and courts are better suited to protect local maritime interests than is
Congress or the federal court system. In addition, Professor Stolz has argued that
the best reason for the separate admiralty jurisdiction is the need for a special court
for the governance of the maritime industry, rather than as a means of deciding
non-commercial maritime claims. 528 F.2d at 747.
105. See 528 F.2d at 747.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 747-48.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 747.
110. The Supreme Court saw a federal interest with respect to maritime navigation
as well as maritime commerce. See 409 U.S. at 269-70.
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regards the need for uniform national treatment by the federal courts.
Conversely many large pleasure craft sail internationally as well as inter-
state, so that it would seem that uniform treatment would be appropriate
for such craft for tort claims arising from their temporary operation in state
territorial waters. It would be highly inconsistent to have created a separate
body of law for maritime commerce in order to provide uniformity and
predictability for its legal affairs because those affairs are primarily inter-
state and international, and at the same time exclude vessels having the
same extent of operations simply because those operations are not for
profit. If predictability is the hallmark of the proper exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction, as the court in Richards seemed to believe,"' the need for
predictability is not necessarily coterminous with the presence of commercial
maritime interests; the proper exercise of admiralty jurisdiction cannot
begin and end with the presence of commerce. The policy argument in
Richards fails to recognize this, and in so doing would include in admiralty
many commercial claims which are primarily local, while excluding from
admiralty many non-commercial claims arising from essentially interstate
or international vessel operation.
In addition the federal versus local interest approach of Richards
appears to be framed in an unjustifiably narrow way in light of recent
Supreme Court policy pronouncements on the subject. Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.112 indicates that the federal interest in uniformity i
much broader than that outlined in Richards. The Moragne Court sought
to effectuate a federally created maritime duty - the warranty of seaworthi-
ness - by recognizing a wrongful death action under the general mari-
time law, 113 even though some commentators had seen no substantial federal
interest in providing such a remedy under maritime law but a weighty
state interest in providing such a remedy under state law alone." 4 The
opinion can be read for the broad proposition that whenever there appears
a need for uniform enforcement of a federally created maritime duty, the
maritime law may be used to bring about such a result regardless of the
presence of local interests." 5 The most obvious case for such a broad
111. See 528 F.2d at 747-48.
112. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
113. Prior to Moragne, the rule had been that there was no provision under the
general maritime law for wrongful death actions, so that federal admiralty courts
would decide such claims under the applicable state law. See The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886). See generally Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes and
Wrongful Death in Territorial Waters, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964); 49 TEXAS
L. REv. 128 (1970); 45 TUL. L. REv. 151 (1970).
114. See, e.g., Stolz, supra note 102, at 100-02.
115. Prior to 1961 the force of this principle favoring uniformity where substantive
maritime duties (and the rights arising therefrom) were involved was not clear. The
Supreme Court had held that state law could not be used to supplement maritime
rights where it would work "material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law," as such an interference would tend to destroy the uniformity
in maritime affairs which had been contemplated by the constitutional grant of
admiralty power to the federal courts. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
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view of the need for uniformity involves those tort claims where the only
basis for a pleasure craft's liability is a statutory violation. Under federal
statutes, pleasure craft are subject to federal statutory navigational and
safety rules." 6  Under the rule of The Pennsylvania"7 a violator of a
statutory rule who is involved in a mishap resulting in personal injury or
property damage is presumed liable. He can exonerate himself only by
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not at fault.1 1 s This
admiralty doctrine puts a statutory violator in far greater jeopardy of being
found liable than does the analogous rule of negligence per se under ordi-
nary tort law.1 9 The basic rationale for imposing such a danger of liability
on a violator of the navigational rules is that the possibility of this danger
tends to encourage strict compliance with those rules.' 2G Excluding pleasure
craft from admiralty tort jurisdiction while keeping them subject to those
navigational rules would result in the anomaly of depriving the rules which
the Supreme Court felt should be most strictly complied with of much of
their compelling force. This would result in a partial frustration of federal
policy in an area where federal interest is most substantial, that being the
protection of navigation on navigable waters.
The court in Richards had other arguments for denying the extension
of admiralty jurisdiction to pleasure craft tort claims within state waters.
The court felt that substantial injustice would occur if pleasure boat owners
were included in the protection provided by the limitation of liability act 2 1
thus limiting their liability to the value of the craft after an accident. Due
to the potentially small value of a wrecked or sunken pleasure boat in rela-
tion to a serious tort claim, the court felt that extending admiralty juris-
216 (1917). This principle applied regardless of the state or federal forum in which
the cause was brought. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). In
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961), however, it became clear that the
Supreme Court had adopted an approach which attempted to balance the federal in-
terest in uniform enforcement of maritime rights and duties against the state interest
in regulating local affairs. It should be noted that in striking this balance the Court
saw "some presumption in favor of applying that [maritime] law toward the validation"
of the maritime right sued upon (which in Kossick was the seaman's traditional right
to maintenance and cure). Id. at 741. The extension of this principle to provide
uniform application of a federal maritime remedy in an area of law - wrongful
death - which had originated in state statutes indicates that the Court in Moragne
has given the uniformity interest even more weight than did the Court in Kossick.
See generally D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALIsm 194-99 (1970).
116. See 33 U.S.C. § 1061(a) (1970). See also 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), where
"vessel" is defined for purposes of statutory interpretation. The Richards court
conceded that pleasure craft are included in this definition. See 528 F.2d at 749.
117. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874).
118. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New Course for an Ancient
Mariner, 54 Bos. U.L. REv. 78, 80 (1974).
119. Under the general tort doctrine of negligence per se, it is up to the party
seeking to impose liability on the statutory violator to prove that the violation caused
the injury. See W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
120. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136.
121. See note 59 supra.
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diction to pleasure boats would deprive some injured parties of most of
their recovery. 122 This is a valid criticism of the limitation statute, but it
is not a compelling reason for excluding pleasure craft from admiralty juris-
diction, as the unjust results feared by the courts are by no means confined
to pleasure craft. The real problem is the statute itself, which is a relic from
the nineteenth century and the heyday of invested capital, and which no
longer serves any useful purpose.12 The remedy for this problem is not
to exclude pleasure craft from admiralty jurisdiction, but rather for Con-
gress to repeal the statute altogether. 124
The final reason which the Richards court expressed for confining
pleasure craft tort claims to state law when they occur in state waters, is
that it saw some doubt as to whether federal courts operating under the
general maritime law could enforce state law causes of action arising under
a state's commercial code, such as breach of warranty, or under state com-
mon law, such as strict liability in tort. 125 It is difficult to determine the
basis of the court's doubt on this matter, for it seems quite clear that mari-
time law can incorporate state law concepts when these doctrines are con-
sistent with the general maritime law, and many courts have found both
breach of warranty actions and strict liability in tort actions cognizable in
admiralty. 126
The arguments on the other side, in St. Hilaire Moye and Oppen,
come down to essentially one position. The relationship to "traditional
maritime activity" required by Executive Jet is to be defined in terms of
vessels plying navigable waters, rather than simply by commercial traffic
upon navigable waters. This conclusion is buttressed by what the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits saw as a substantial federal interest requiring a broad-
ened view of "traditional maritime activity." The federal government has
traditionally been quite concerned with the protection of navigation on
navigable waters, so that it has an obvious interest in regulating any activity
that poses a potential threat to freedom of navigation. Pleasure craft not
only pose such a threat, but as vessels in navigation their owners and op-
erators also have a need for predictability in the rules governing such
navigation.127 The Richards court, while recognizing the need for uni-
122. 528 F.2d at 748.
123. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, §§ 10-1 - 10-3.
124. It has been suggested that the unfairness insofar as limiting the liability of
pleasure craft is concerned would be mitigated by limiting the value of a wrecked
vessel to a certain minimum sum. See Note, Value of a Wrecked Vessel, 52 TEXAS
L. REv. 114 (1973). While this is at least a rational legislative alternative, there
appears no good reason, given the availability of the corporate device to limit a
shipowner's liability without the act, why the act should not be eliminated altogether.
See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, §§ 10-1 to 10-3. See generally Harolds, Limita-
tion of Liability and Its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 TEMPLE L.Q. 423 (1964).
125. See 528 F.2d at 748.
126. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 345 F.
Supp. 395 (N.D. Cal. 1971), and authorities cited therein; cf. Higginbotham v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973).
127. See 496 F.2d at 979; 485 F.2d at 257.
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formity of navigational rules in the pleasure craft area, contended that
uniformity would result by allowing state courts to enforce rules of navi-
gation in conjunction with state tort law.12 8 The problem with such a
scheme, as previously noted, 1 29 is that it would reduce the intended deter-
rent force of the navigational and safety rules by making inapplicable a
doctrine designed to encourage strict compliance with those rules, a
doctrine only available under the maritime law. Thus far it would appear
that the approach to "maritime nexus" indicated by St. Hilaire Moye and
Oppen is superior to that of Richards in that it produces more consistent
results and has fewer theoretical problems.
The principal objection to the "vessel" approach of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits is that it fails to comport with the historical function of
maritime law to provide a uniform body of law for the shipping industry. 3 0
Historically the maritime law has only been applied to commercial vessels,' 3'
and therefore there is arguably no good reason for believing that the legis-
lative or judicial intention was in favor of its application to all types of
waterborne craft. While this objection may be historically accurate, it
overlooks two very important considerations. First, mass production tech-
nology has only recently provided pleasure craft in sufficient numbers to
generate any significant amount of litigation involving their use in state
territorial waters. 132 It is thus hardly surprising when one discovers a
dearth of judicial opinion on this subject until only recently. The lack
of authority on this issue does not compel the conclusion that Congress
or the courts intended one outcome rather than another. Second, there
are very good reasons for including "vessels" within the historical purposes
of the maritime law as pointed out by the court in St. Hilaire Moye."3
All vessels plying navigable waters, regardless of size or their commercial
status, face unique hazards on those waters, hazards often resulting in
tort claims with which the maritime law, due to centuries of experience,
is peculiarly suited to deal. Pleasure craft are no less subject to these
hazards than are commercial vessels,1 4 so it would seem that the historical
128. See 528 F.2d at 747-48. The probability that the Richards formula would
result in an absence of unifi'm regulation of maritime navigation is high. The result
under Richards would essentially be that two different types of craft would operate
upon the same waters under separate duties and responsibilities imposed by different
sovereigns. Due to the Supreme Court's obvious intention to retain federal hegemony
over the application of federal maritime law to substantial maritime rights and duties,
see note 115 supra, the Richards result seems both illogical and contrary to stated
Supreme Court policy.
129. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
130. For an exposition of this "historical function" argument in the pleasure boat
context, see Stolz, supra note 102, at 665-99. See also Note, Hops, Skips and Jumps
into Admiralty Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & Comm. 625, 636-38 (1973).
131. See authorities cited in note 130 supra.
132. See note 1 supra.
133. See 396 F.2d at 979.
134. Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975) discussed in note 85
supra, is indicative of one of the unique hazards of waterborne travel around which
special duties have evolved resulting in tort liability. In that case the plaintiff's pleasure
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function of maritime law in dealing with these unique situations is no less
appropriate in the pleasure boat context than it is in the context of com-
mercial vessels. It is for these reasons that the historical objection to the
"vessel" approach toward "maritime nexus" is less than convincing.
CONCLUSION
Tort claims arising out of pleasure craft operation on state territorial
waters have presented the federal courts with new admiralty jurisdictional
issues. Lack of clear guidance by the Supreme Court, especially in the
ambiguous opinion in Executive Jet, has driven the lower courts to analyze
the basic purposes in having a separate body of admiralty law in order
to resolve these issues. Lower court analysis has not been uniform. Thus,
in Richards, the Fourth Circuit focused on the commercial needs of the
shipping industry as the essential justification for admiralty law, putting
itself in a position where it is forced to make absurd distinctions between in-
jured passengers and injured non-passengers in order to effectuate its policy
without abrogating precedent. It was this very sort of fortuity, however,
that the Supreme Court was seeking to eliminate when it introduced the
"maritime nexus" requirement. The policy analysis adopted in St. Hilaire
Moye and Oppen, on the other hand, seems clearly more desirable in that
it excludes fortuitous, non-maritime tort claims from admiralty jurisdiction
while at the same time avoiding the strained reasoning and inconsistency
of result found in Crosson and Richards. Thus interpreting "maritime
nexus" as requiring a connection only with a waterborne vessel or some
function normally carried on by such a vessel would eliminate from ad-
miralty jurisdiction such troublesome claims as surfboard accidents, 35
swimmers colliding with the submerged section of land-based structures, 36
and automobile mishaps on ferry-boat ramps. 13 7 This approach has the
virtue of simplicity of application possessed by the locality test without
sharing the vice of an over-inclusiveness resulting in fortuitous claims
being heard in admiralty. It would keep pleasure craft tort claims under
maritime law, which is appropriate given the federal interests involved in
adjudicating such claims under that law, without opening too widely
the door to the federal court house. The ultimate resolution of this policy
conflict rests with the Supreme Court or Congress, but meanwhile it
appears that the "vessel" approach taken by St. Hilaire Moye and Oppen
is superior to that taken by Richards in determining admiralty jurisdiction
over pleasure craft tort claims.
craft collided with an unmarked wreck whose presence could not be detected from the
surface. The court indicated that the government had an affirmative duty to mark or
remove such obstacles to maritime navigation, while the plaintiff also had a duty to
be familiar with the waters navigated. Id. at 179-80. There is little analogy in general
tort law to these sorts of duties.
135. See 409 U.S. at 265 n.5.
136. Id.
137. See Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir.
1972).
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